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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-1981 
___________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
LOUIS MARTIN AGNES, 
 Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. Crim. No. 93-cr-00314) 
District Judge:  Honorable Ronald L. Buckwalter 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to  
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
October 30, 2014 
 
Before:  FISHER, SHWARTZ and SLOVITER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  November 5, 2014) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Louis Martin Agnes, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals an order of the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania denying his motion 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 36.  For the reasons that follow, we will 
affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 On July 25, 1995, Agnes was sentenced on convictions for numerous counts of 
drug trafficking.  When his sentence was imposed, Agnes was serving a sentence for 
violating parole related to an earlier conviction.  The District Court stated at sentencing 
that the 292-month sentence for each count was to be served concurrently with each other 
and concurrently with the parole violation sentence.  The judgment, however, provided 
that the sentence on each count was to run concurrently with each other, but did not 
reference the parole violation sentence.  On May 6, 1996, the District Court amended the 
judgment to provide that the sentence “is to run concurrently to the violation of parole 
[s]entence the defendant is currently serving.”  5/6/96 Order.     
 On October 16, 2009, Agnes filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 36 asserting that he should receive credit towards his 292-month sentence for 
time served on his parole violation sentence from January 29, 1993 through July 24, 
1995.  The District Court denied the motion on the merits.  We affirmed the District 
Court’s judgment on the ground that Agnes’ challenge was not properly brought under 
Rule 36.  We explained that Rule 36 allows the court to correct clerical errors in a 
judgment, and that the error alleged by Agnes – that the District Court intended his 
sentence to run retroactively concurrent with his parole violation sentence – was not such 
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an error.  United States v. Agnes, 490 F. App’x 426, 428 (3d Cir. 2012) (non-
precedential).   
 On December 16, 2013, Agnes filed another motion pursuant to Rule 36 again 
arguing that his drug trafficking sentence should run concurrently with his parole 
violation sentence so that he would get credit for the 29 months served before his 
sentencing on July 25, 1995.  Agnes asserted that the District Court made a clerical error 
when it amended its judgment by providing that his sentence would run “concurrent to” 
instead of “concurrent with” his parole revocation sentence.  In response, the United 
States argued that Agnes’ motion was barred by the doctrine of res judicata.  Noting its 
previous decision and this Court’s decision on appeal, the District Court denied the 
motion.  This appeal followed.   
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We have not decided the 
standard of review applicable to the denial of a Rule 36 motion and other courts of 
appeals have applied different standards.  See, e.g., United States v. Dickie, 752 F.2d 
1398, 1400 (9th Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (applying a clear error standard); United 
States v. Niemiec, 689 F.2d 688, 692 (7th Cir. 1982) (applying an abuse of discretion 
standard).  We will not resolve this question here because Agnes is not entitled to 
relief under either standard. 
 The District Court and this Court have previously addressed Agnes’ claim.  Agnes 
reframes his claim in an effort to bring it within the purview of Rule 36, but he is 
attempting to relitigate the claim raised in his prior motion.  Agnes argued below that he 
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did not have a full opportunity to litigate his first motion in District Court, but he 
appealed and the matter was fully briefed in this Court. 
   Accordingly, because this appeal does not raise a substantial question, we will 
summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.   
